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Abstract 
 
The city of Detroit, Michigan has some level of distinction due to its current challenges 
with its public school system, recovery from bankruptcy and the stain of an ex-mayor 
who was convicted of corruption charges.  Perhaps less well known is the fact that Detroit 
has had a rich and complex history with struggle and social unrest, culminating famously 
during July of 1967 in a bloody riot. The city was arguably as close to its destruction as it 
has ever been. Still, amazingly, the city faced the crisis head on and slowly rebounded 
from its devastating impact. History is said to repeat itself when humans don’t digest its 
lessons, and if this is indeed true then a careful examination of the past is not only prudent 
but critical.  This article offers an overview of the history of the city of Detroit and the 
aforementioned riot. In addition, there is a focus on three organizations born of the 
devastation that still remain in some form nearly 50 years later.  These organizations were 
pivotal in the repair of the damage to the city’s image and both the physical and 
psychosocial safety of its residents in the immediate years following the riot. Specifically, 
they spearheaded community dialogue, economic development, and enhanced sensitivity 
to race relations. Future leaders, not only in Detroit but also in other urban cities, may 
glean valuable lessons from this pivotal event in order to learn how to become effective 
leaders when faced with crisis. 
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Introduction 
To say that the city of Detroit is an enigma is an understatement at best. Arguably, 
there are no other American cities that can boast a similar level of complexity. Detroit is 
paradoxical – both innovative and stagnant in many ways. Detroit has two distinct 
perspectives; that of the ‘outsider’ and that of the ‘insider’.  
 
In the eyes of many ‘outsiders’, Detroit is simply a city in despair. Detroit is 
indeed the birthplace of the manufacturing industry and Motown. It also continues to 
suffer from widespread racial segregation. Despite boasting tremendous cultural diversity 
  
with enclaves of African American, Hispanic, Polish, Middle Eastern and Jewish 
communities, the city has been marked by pervasive and widespread poverty within its 
residency base (Nelson, 2012). Unaddressed racial tensions have also been identified as 
some of the underlying reasons for a sort of polarizing of regional resources (Sugrue, 
1996).  
 
The city of Detroit has a history of political scandal.  Some of the meetings of the 
local City Council have been described as a breeding ground for histrionic and criminal 
behavior (Neavling, 2012). Most recently, past mayor Kwame Kilpatrick was sentenced 
to 28 years in prison for charges ranging from racketeering to tax evasion (Laing, 2014).  
 
Detroit possesses a dubious distinction of being one of the most segregated major 
cities (Kaffer, 2009; Trowbridge, 2002; U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), one of the most 
violent cities (Hunter, 2010), suffering from chronic unemployment (Martin, 2009) and 
surviving two major riots that ended in significant bloodshed (Fine, 2007).  Detroit has 
had some of the highest high school dropout rates in the entire country.  Within the past 
decade, it is estimated that only 25% of high school students completed their education 
and graduated (Fields, 2008).  The educational system within the city of Detroit has been 
problematic for decades.  In present day Detroit, the rapidly dwindling population has 
resulted in enrollment dropping in an equally quickly manner. Not surprisingly, this has 
resulted in the closing of many schools in densely populated areas in order to conserve 
resources while serving as many children as possible. This strategy has criticized in light 
of accusations of serious fiscal mismanagement ranging from egregious misconduct by 
administrators to “phantom” billing practices (Mrozowski, 2009). 
 
The media has also played a significant role in public perception of the city to 
‘outsiders’.  The gamut of fodder for national review has ranged from reviews of the 
practice of Devil’s Night (Gray, 2009) 1 , to the numerous criminal activities and 
allegations against former mayors (Gray, 2007; Holson, 2009; Huffstutter, 2008; 
Williams, 2010; Laing, 2014). The city has been described as being, “apocalyptic” 
(Mustafa, 2014).  The economic base has eroded significantly and consistently.  The 
average price of a home in the city of Detroit in 2014 is $7,500 and the unemployment 
rate is 29% (Clement, 2014). Based on census data, the median household income was 
$28,357 in 2010 (United States Census Bureau, 2014) and has decreased to $26,955 as of 
2012 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). This is even more compelling when the same 
sources report that the medium income within the State of Michigan has slightly 
increased in the same period of time from $48,432 in 2010 to $48,471 in 2012.  In 2010, 
the Census Bureau reported that the percentage of individuals below the poverty level 
within the city was 34.5% and in a mere two years it increased to 38.1%. Comparatively, 
the percentage of individuals across the state of Michigan below the poverty level is 
16.3% (United States Census Bureau, 2014).  
                                                        
1 The phrase “Devil’s Night” is a term to describe a former local practice of arsons throughout the 
city on the day before Halloween. 
  
 
The ‘insider’s’ view of Detroit includes the aforementioned elements but it is also 
richly layered in additional complexities, such as the fact that Detroit also boasts a 
thriving youth demographic, a significant appreciation and recognition for artistic 
expression, richly diverse cultural options and a booming entrepreneurial movement. 
There are many ‘treasures’ in the city of Detroit that never fail to surprise and delight 
both newcomers and residents alike. There is energy in the city that is contagious and 
inspires fierce loyalty as evidenced in the notable presence of the old English “D” on 
vehicles and clothing alike.  
 
Despite this positive momentum, at the time of this writing, the recent event that is 
most compelling about the city of Detroit is the fact that it was the largest U.S. city ever 
to file bankruptcy in June of 2013 (Lichterman & Woodall, 2013; Matthews, 2013). It has 
been assessed that the city owes more than $18 billion to over 100,000 creditors and that 
more than $18 million in property taxes were unpaid in 2012 (Islam, 2013). The majority 
of the debt is the pensions of decades of city workers (Laing, 2014 & Steyn, 2014)). The 
bankruptcy immediately made both national and international news, similarly to the 
media surrounding the judicial proceedings of the city’s formal mayor a mere year prior. 
For many, the bankruptcy marked the end of an era; some even argued that it was the end 
of the proverbial American dream. On the day that the bankruptcy was announced, 
Michael Moore tweeted, “Detroit (1701-2013). Don’t cry for us America. You’re next.” 
(Moore, 2014).  Many assume that the bankruptcy signals the final death knell after a 
decades-long decline of available resources that are the consequences of both a severely 
depressed economy and gentrification. There are others who argue that the bankruptcy 
allows for the city to regroup and re-evaluate its resources and strategies to become a 
stronger version of what it once was.   
 
Regardless of one’s stance on whether the bankruptcy is a curse or a blessing, it is 
merely the most recent distinction in what has been more than 300 years of a unique 
history - at times rendering the city both famous and infamous. This is not the first time 
that the city of Detroit has been in the center of a crisis. The city’s motto – “we hope for 
better days; it shall rise from its ashes” - refers to one of the first unfortunate events, when 
the entire city was destroyed by fire in 1805 (Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000).  
Overwhelming racial tension resulting from the lack of segregation and the presence of 
equal opportunity for jobs within the automotive industry is identified as the cause of a 
bloody race riot in 1943 (Sugrue, 2009).  
 
Another prominent event that could have very easily eradicated the city of Detroit 
was a riot that occurred over a total of seven days during the summer of 1967.  A review 
of this event and the subsequent efforts to rebuild the city after suffering from significant 
structural and psychosocial damage is worthy of a closer look. The 1967 riot resulted in 
consequences that were far-reaching and distinguish Detroit from other major cities 
within the country.  
 
  
Further, it can be argued that the economic impact of such a significant event has 
caused a ripple effect in the culture of the city of Detroit and that the reverberations have 
influenced subsequent consumption and growth patterns. In Institutions, Institutional 
Change and Economic Performance, author Doug C. North (1990) eloquently described 
the importance of culture on institutional economics in the following quote: 
 
History matters.  It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because of a society’s institutions.  Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by 
the past.  And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional 
evolution.  Integrating institutions into economic theory and economic history is 
an essential step in improving that theory and history.  (p. vii) 
 
This theory supports the assertion that an event nearly 50 years ago not only impacts the 
future, but also that thoughtful consideration of the event can potentially offer solutions 
that may work today.  Therefore, the current reality of the city of Detroit’s bankruptcy 
cannot truly assert its independence--it is born of the past seeds that were sown that 
created this potential future.  One of these seeds was planted in the aftermath of the 1967 
riot.   
 
 One of the most disturbing realizations is that the current state of Detroit is in 
many ways quite similar to the Detroit of 1967.  The majority of the city’s residents are 
still African American. There is still a marked contrast between the availability of 
services and housing between the inner city and the surrounding suburbs. There is a sense 
of futility regarding the political processes and those within the leadership ranks have, at 
times, demonstrated moments of contention and disjointedness. The educational system 
remains incredibly challenged and tainted by corruption. In a recent report it was 
identified that a third of the structures in the city of Detroit need to be demolished and/or 
significantly rehabbed and that it would take nearly $850 million to achieve this goal 
(Data Driven Detroit, 2014). The city that offers capacity for 1.8 million people now 
holds a mere 700,000 residents (Davey, 2014) and the population dropped by 3% between 
2010 and 2013 (United States Census Bureau, 2014). It is estimated that 60% of children 
in Detroit are living in poverty (Matthews, 2013). The past does not seem that far behind 
the city of Detroit. 
 
In The Origins of the Urban Crisis:  Race and Inequality in Post-War Detroit, 
author and historian Thomas Sugrue (1996) remarked: 
the rehabilitation of Detroit . . . will require a more vigorous attempt to grapple 
with the enduring effects of the postwar transformation of the city, and creative 
responses, piece by piece, to the interconnected forces of race, residence, 
discrimination, and industrial decline, the consequences of a troubled and still 
unresolved past.  (p. 11)  
 
 Sugrue’s suggestion that “creative responses” be deployed to address the 
socioeconomic status of Detroit is compelling.  This supports the need to consider all of 
  
the forces that can affect the development of such a complex city. One may wonder how a 
city that seemingly thrived under the masterful direction of automobile pioneer Henry 
Ford and gave birth to the musical legacy of Motown can fall to such depths.  This 
chapter will review the history of the city of Detroit - specifically focusing on the riot of 
1967 and its aftermath – and offer perspective on how lessons learned after the riot of 
1967 can potentially aid efforts to restore balance to the city in its current state of 
bankruptcy. 
 
The History of the City of Detroit 
 
The city of Detroit is 138 square miles in land area and is the largest city in the 
state of Michigan (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). It is the only location where Canada is 
technically south of the United States.  Its unique location made it highly desirable for 
settlers. A French military officer from Montreal, Canada named Antoine de la Mothe 
Cadillac founded the city of Detroit in 1701 (Junior Worldmark Encyclopedia of World 
Cities, 2000). Its original name was Fort Pontchartrain du Detroit. 
 
Henry Ford initiated the influx of the manufacturing era when he created the 
Model T and based the headquarters for Ford Motor Company in Detroit.  Shortly 
thereafter, General Motors also established its headquarters in Detroit, which led to 
Detroit being defined as: 
… America’s showcase city.  The auto industry rule[d]--and the money flow[ed] 
almost unabated. New construction, modern schools and modern approaches to 
city life left the national news media spellbound (Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000, 
p. 45). 
 
This period of growth resulted in two historic firsts within the city of Detroit; the first 
mile of concrete was laid in the city in the early 1900s and the ultimately the first 
highway would be developed as well (Junior Worldmark Encyclopedia of World Cities, 
2000). 
 
 At the same time that Detroit was becoming an economic powerhouse, the cultural 
foundation began to flourish as well.  Famed artist Diego Rivera created beautiful murals 
in tribute to Henry Ford in the early 1930s and they were showcased within the Detroit 
Institute of Arts, which is still regarded as one of the finest art museums in the country. It 
can be argued that the present day intense loyalty that Detroiters have for their sports 
teams originated with a deep-seated love for Joe Louis when he earned the title of 
Heavyweight Champion of the World on June 22, 1938. This victory not only shined a 
spotlight on Detroit, it also was a source of pride for African Americans in what could be 
described as a challenging time in race relations in this country. 
 
Detroit has been one of the most segregated cities in the country for many years 
(Kaffer, 2009; Trowbridge, 2002). Its predominant population is African American. 
Despite this fact, it is not accurate to assume that Detroit has always embraced its African 
  
American population. The truth is somewhat complicated. Detroit has the distinction of 
having being a “stop” on the Underground Railroad, which was the escape route for many 
African Americans who desired to escape the brutal slavery practices prevalent in the 
South (The Underground Railroad Living Museum, 2014). Ironically, the ‘promised land’ 
that many sought out was highly influenced by slave masters who had so much prestige 
and influence that major streets within the city of Detroit were named after them, such as 
General John R. Williams, Joseph Campau and George McDougall  (Eyes on Fire, 2007).  
  
Still, Detroit represented the possibility of freedom that simply did not exist in the 
South.  Consequently, African Americans who were both slaves and free desired to live in 
the city of Detroit.  Between 1840 and 1850, the African Americans population nearly 
tripled from 193 to 587 (J. Williams, 2009).  The population continued to grow to the 
point that they began to rival the majority Caucasian population. By the early 1940s there 
were just under a quarter of a million African Americans in Detroit (Baulch & Zacharias, 
1999).  Largely restricted in where they could live due to segregation and discrimination 
in housing practices, the majority of them settled into an enclave known as Black Bottom.  
The living conditions within the housing units in Black Bottom were deplorable.  Tenets 
were forced to sleep in “‘hot sheet’ boardinghouses, where beds turned over every eight 
hours as one shift set out for work and the last returned home” (Sugrue, 2009, p. 66).  
 
 Despite the strained living conditions, Black Bottom became known as a thriving 
and culturally rich community. African Americans began to conduct business with each 
other in increasing numbers and the circulation of funds fostered success.  This is no 
small task considering the fact that African Americans represented only 4.1% of the 
population (Granzo, 2012). In his book, Detroit:  The Black Bottom Community (2009), 
Jeremy Williams offers the following description of the community at that time: 
By 1920, blacks owned 350 businesses in Detroit, including a movie theater, the 
only African-American pawn shop in the United States, a co-op grocery, and a 
bank.  The community included 17 physicians, 22 lawyers, 22 barbershops, 13 
dentists, 123 cartage agencies, 11 tailors, 10 restaurants, 10 real estate dealers, 8 
grocers, 6 drugstores, 5 undertakers, 4 employment offices, a few service stations, 
and a candy-maker (p. 17). 
 
By the early 1940s Detroit had become a thriving metropolis.  Between the 
sustained economic advantage provided by advancement of the automotive industry and 
the manufacturing ‘business’ provided by World War II, there were enough employment 
opportunities for nearly anyone who desired them. While there were opportunities for 
blacks to work alongside whites, the environments were racially charged. Detroit was not 
immune to the prevailing social tensions that permeated the country. African Americans 
were able to gain employment but housing opportunities remained much more limited for 
them than for their Caucasian counterparts. Many African Americans had to live in 
housing that did not provide indoor plumbing while paying rent at a rate of two to three 
times that of comparable housing for Caucasians (Baulch & Zacharias, 1999).  
Ultimately, the tension between reached a boiling point and overflowed on June 3, 1943 
  
when Caucasians in many plants decided to launch a strike to protest the fact that they 
had to work in a non-segregated environment (Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000, p. 47).  A 
mere three weeks later on June 20th 1943 a riot began on the Belle Isle Bridge2.  
 
The exact cause of the riot is widely disputed. The stories range from a mother 
and a child being thrown from the bridge (J. Williams, 2009) to a fight between African 
Americans and Caucasians (Eyes on Fire, 2007) to the sexual assault of a Caucasian 
woman (Baulch & Zacharias, 1999; Poremba, 1999). While the cause is not exactly clear, 
the riot was brutal and is regarded as a race riot where Caucasians and African Americans 
openly and savagely attacked each other and looted local establishments (J. Williams, 
2009). The violence migrated from the bridge to the Black Bottom and Paradise Valley 
areas of the city, which were the centers of African American life at that time.  The 
brutality was so extreme that when the violence began to spill over into the second day, 
Governor Harry Kelly declared martial law and requested the assistance of the U.S. Army 
(Fine, 2007; Locke, 1969; Sugrue, 1996). The brutality utilized by the military was 
significant and had devastating consequences, as evidenced by a statement made by 
Brigadier General William Guther, who said that, “Detroit’s nearly all-white force of 
3,400 officers had been very harsh and brutal.  They have treated the Negroes terribly 
[and] have gone altogether too far” (Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000, p. 48).  Ultimately, 
the riot lasted for three days, caused 34 fatalities, nearly 600 injured and between 1,300 
and 1,800 arrests (J. Williams, 2009; Locke, 1969).  Shockingly, the excessive force of 
both local police and the military caused more than 50% of the fatalities (Sugrue, 1996). 
The race riot of Detroit was not a unique occurrence in the nation at that time. There were 
close to 240 race riots in the same timeframe throughout the United States but the Detroit 
riot was considered the most violent of them all (Takaki, 2008). 
 
The 1943 riot resulted in an even deeper gulf between the races within the city of 
Detroit. Caucasians began to leave relocate to homes further from the city while African 
Americans remain contained within the same substandard living conditions they had 
inhabited before the riot. There was significant unrest within the community and racial 
relations seemed strained beyond repair (J. Williams, 2009). Edward Jeffries was the 
mayor of Detroit at that time and he received pressure to offer resolution of some sort so 
that the city could begin to move forward. He invited several local business leaders to a 
meeting to brainstorm on potential solutions. Consequently, The Detroit Plan was 
developed.  
 
The Detroit Plan was a “slum clearance” strategy specifically designed to 
eradicate the “blight issue” in the city. The plan proposed the elimination of “20 square 
city blocks [in Detroit]” (J. Williams, 2009, p. 10). Described as “urban renewal”, the 
plan detailed the construction of major freeways that would allow for commuting between 
the city and the steadily growing outlying suburbs, the development of a city park and the 
revitalization of an area in midtown Detroit (J. Williams, 2009).  In order to make 
                                                        
2 Belle Isle is a small island in between Michigan and Canada. 
  
adequate space for such massive construction, the plan also required that the area where 
the crux of the construction would be focused – Black Bottom and Paradise Valley – be 
bulldozed to the ground. The demolition began almost immediately after The Detroit Plan 
was approved. The center of community for African Americans within the city of Detroit 
was obliterated. The Detroit Plan did not recognize the tremendous damage to this 
segment of the community, nor did it accommodate for new construction to accommodate 
for those who were outplaced as a result of The Detroit Plan. Thomas Sugrue described 
the area formerly known as Black Bottom as a “no man’s land of deterioration and 
abandonment” (Sugrue, 1996, p. 47). Historian Jeremy Williams (2009) detailed the 
destruction further in the following excerpt: 
Statistics show that by 1950, 423 residences, 109 businesses, 22 manufacturing 
plants, and 93 vacant lots had been condemned for the first three-mile stretch of 
the Lodge Freeway, from Jefferson Avenue to Pallister Street.  A concrete wall 
divided white from black . . . By 1958, the Lodge Freeway had gobbled up 2,222 
buildings.  Demolition continued with approximately 2,800 more buildings to 
make way for the Edsel Ford Expressway.  (pp. 119-120) 
 
Not surprisingly, the “urban renewal” that The Detroit Plan promised was not 
received as such within the African American community. The development of a sense of 
vitality and even some level of prosperity that African Americans were able to create in 
those areas despite the squalid living conditions was intrinsically tied to the self-efficacy 
of these individuals. The leadership response to the riot of 1943 was truly a double-edged 
sword. The construction of the major freeways absolutely contributed to further fostering 
economic development and residential expansion outside of the city of Detroit into the 
surrounding suburban areas. The investment into both a beautiful city park and more 
retail opportunities within the center of the Detroit spurred increased business 
opportunities.  
 
However, the price tag to such development was vastly more than what was 
estimated in The Detroit Plan. There was an invaluable cost to the collective 
consciousness of African Americans, who were not only largely excluded from reaping 
the benefits of such advancement, they ‘paid’ for it through the loss of their community as 
they had come to know it. The most vulnerable segment of the population was left more 
disenfranchised than they had been before the riot. Instead of encouraging healing for all 
residents, the leadership response to the riot of 1943 resulted in institutionalized division 
and exacerbated the lack of economic parity. During times of crisis it is imperative to 
develop and implement strategies that result in the community collectively healing and 
experiencing revitalization together (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007).  One can argue 
that it is fair to assert that the response at that time was short sighted and not 
encompassing the needs of all of the constituents of the city of Detroit.   As George 
Santayana observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” 
(Santayana, 1905). Detroit would have the opportunity to redeem itself nearly a quarter of 
a century later.  
 
  
 
A Decade of Change: 1960 -1969 
 
 The Constitution asserts that the United States of America was founded on 
principles of  “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (United States Constitution, 
2003).   Such idealistic values are some of the things that set the country apart from any 
other. The United States of America is often a symbol of freedom and presumably devoid 
of oppression for those who live in areas of the world where oppression is far too often 
the norm as opposed to the exception. The aforementioned values also speak to 
expectations from its citizens with regards to how they should be treated and effectively 
incorporated into what has been described as a ‘melting pot’. Consequently, the truth that 
many groups of individuals have not felt embraced within the United States is a paradox 
that has existed since the writing of the Constitution. Since the founding of our country 
there have been efforts to not only force the government to recognize that all groups of 
people were not treated equally, but to ensure the inclusion of all in the equity that the 
Constitution refers to. Beginning with the rights of Native Americans and continuing to 
the rights of various cultures and women, the injustices against those groups who have 
been defined as “minorities” have been innumerable and were largely not regarded as 
significant. These issues would come to a head during the revolutionary period of 1960.   
 
 When President John F. Kennedy challenged the country to  “ask not what your 
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country” (1961), it seemed as 
though this ignited a period of intense reflection on the current state of affairs within the 
United States from a sociological perspective. There were numerous expressions of 
indignation regarding the treatment of African Americans and women in particular. The 
informal discussions rapidly escalated into formal protests against unequal treatment. 
Boycotts, sit-ins, organized expressions of injustices and marches began to occur with 
more frequently in an attempt to demand equity and the eradication of civil rights 
injustices for individuals who were treated as second class citizens. A little known fact is 
that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. first came to Detroit to speak before went to Washington 
and spoke to his desire for all children to, “one day live in a nation where they will not be 
judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character” (1968). 
 
 In addition to the civil rights struggles within the United States there was also the 
divisive element of the United States’ participation in the Vietnam War. There were 
numerous expressions of both support and protest of our involvement. General trust for 
government was at a low that it had not experienced before.  Juxtapose these occurrences 
with the Apollo 11 successfully landing on the moon. Something previously 
inconceivable brought the country together to marvel at the United States’ ability to 
develop technology that could literally take us out of this world. Yet there remained 
significant turmoil within the population. The civil unrest began to weave its way into 
popular cultural as well. Many books and music documented and examined the struggle 
for equal rights and an emphasis on love for all mankind. Musical expression included 
  
contributions from Marvin Gaye, Bob Dylan, The Rolling Stones, Joni Mitchell, Joan 
Baez and even the Beatles. 
 As time went on, the relatively calm expressions of protest began to escalate to 
more violent expressions of indignation. Towards the latter half of the decade, riots  
began to occur in cities around the country. Some of the more notable ones occurred in 
Newark, Watts, and Detroit.  The Detroit riot of 1967 has the infamous distinction of 
being “one of the most brutal riots in American history” (Sugrue, 1996, p. 259). 
 
The Detroit Riot of 1967 
 
 The two decades between the riot of 1943 and the riot of 1967 gave birth to a 
transformation occurred within the city of Detroit in regards to public perception. The city 
went from being a site of a horrific riot that was born of the ugliness of racism to being 
referred to as a “model city” for race relations between Caucasians and African 
Americans (Fine, 2007).  Detroit was the richest per capital city in the United States of 
America during the 1960s (Matthews, 2013). The 1960s were a time of intense focus to 
position Detroit as a progressive city by the local government. The ability to do this 
successfully resulted in the city receiving funds from the federal government and also to 
be lauded for its commitment to resolve racial discord within its community. The general 
public, who also regarded Detroit as being a pre-eminent leader in race relations, also 
embraced this effort. Widick (1989) expressed this as being indicative of “Victorian 
optimism” and remarked that, “nowhere [else] in the nation were there more illusions 
about the influence of society and significant social progress than with the national press 
singling out Detroit’s way as the future of America” (p. 11). There was so much belief in 
the utopic perception of Detroit that the mayor and the governor were so confident of 
Detroit’s position as a healed city that they heavily petitioned for Detroit to be the host 
city of the Olympics in 1963 (Fine, 2007). The prevalence of such strong perceptions was 
one of the main reasons that people were so shocked when the riot occurred. It was nearly 
unfathomable by not only residents but also the better part of the country that such a thing 
could happen in Detroit. 
 
 The riot of 1967 began on Sunday, July 23rd.  The incident that sparked the riot 
was an arrest at a “blind pig” located on 12th Street. The term “blind pig” described 
establishments that offered alcohol for purchase after 2 a.m. At this time, selling alcohol 
after 2 a.m. was illegal so blind pigs regularly drew the attention of law enforcement. 
Blind pigs drew both individuals who simply wanted to release the stress of the previous 
week in addition to those who were purveyors of more salacious forms of stress release  
(Fine, 2007).   This dichotomy resulted in many African Americans feeling that blind pigs 
were more harmful than positive elements of the community (Locke, 1969).  Not only did 
blind pigs contribute to the plethora of negative perceptions that existed about African 
Americans, they negatively impacted the businesses that held legitimate liquor licenses by 
robbing them of sales.  Further, blind pigs attracted a lot of attention from law 
enforcement, which is exactly what happened in the wee hours of the morning on July 23, 
1967. 
  
 
The blind pig on 12th Street was not a stranger to law enforcement; so much so 
that in the previous year it had been raided nine times (Fine, 2007). Consequently, when a 
complaint was called into the precinct, it was a fairly routine run for officers. The evening 
of the 23rd had been a particularly busy one and officers decided to arrest all of the 
individuals present. The officers needed to call for backup to transport everyone. As 
people were loaded into the wagons to be delivered to the precinct for processing, a 
crowd of neighborhood residents began to gather outside of the blind pig. The crowd 
became especially boisterous and began to hurt insults and bottles at some of the officers 
(Fine, 2007; Locke, 1969).  There are some accounts that indicate that this occurred 
because the officers were treating the detainees with excessive force (Fine, 2007).  The 
continually growing crowd became angrier and, ultimately, became the germinating 
element that began the riot.  
 
The timing of the start of the riot was unfortunate. In 1967, staffing for the local 
police department was largely dependent on trends in activity. The arrests at the blind pig 
occurred after 2 a.m. and this was, “the time of the lowest incidence of crime in Detroit . . 
. [and] Sunday was normally the day off for the Mounted Bureau, the department’s third 
crowd-control unit” (Fine, 2007, p. 164).  This timing resulted in the availability of only 
193 officers available to cover the riot in its earliest hours, when the violence began to 
exponentially escalate and extensive looting and arsons began to spread across the city 
(Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000). The local law enforcement began to realize that they 
were significantly under resourced and attempted to engage support from both State of 
Michigan and Michigan National Guard officers. Ironically, timing was again not a friend 
to the city of Detroit. The majority of the officers within the Michigan National Guard 
were unavailable due to out of state training (Fine, 2007).   
 
The lack of available law enforcement may have led to an assumption of a lack of 
concern on their part by the early rioters and that the activities were of little importance. 
The atmosphere during this time was described as akin to, “a carnival atmosphere [with] a 
giddy sense of release from the oppression of routine, white-dominated life in the ghetto” 
(Fine, 2007, p. 165).  The activity continued steadily and expanded quickly, canvassing 
much of the east side of the city. By the end of the first day it was clear to local and state 
government that the city was in crisis, with more than 1,000 arrests and over 300 fires 
(Fine, 2007; Johnson, 2008; Locke, 1969). The governor at the time – George Romney 
(father of Mitt Romney) declared that the city of Detroit was in a state of emergency. He 
also instituted a curfew within the city limits in an attempt to stem the tide of destruction. 
The curfew was specific in nature, as documented by historian Sydney Fine (2007): 
 
The executive order accompanying the governor’s proclamation forbade anyone 
other than law enforcement to carry firearms, ammunition, explosives, or 
inflammable materials; closed all places of amusement and all places selling or 
dispensing alcoholic beverages; forbade the assemblage of more than five persons; 
and stipulated a 9:00 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. curfew . . . (p. 188) 
  
 
The second day of the riot was as devastating as the first, and began to garner 
national attention. Mayor Jerome Cavanaugh and Governor Romney collaborated and 
made the decision to request assistance from the federal government, as the curfew had 
largely been ignored and resources to quell the uprising were challenged to say the least. 
It is reported that initially, President Johnson was concerned about whether dispatching 
federal troops to Detroit was appropriate considering the fact that the ‘enemies’ were 
American citizens  (Fine, 2007). He requested several public readings of proclamations 
that attempted to appeal to residents to suspend all rioting activity (Fine, 2007). 
Ultimately, he complied with the request and dispatched 5,000 federal troops to the city 
of Detroit to assist with ending the riot (Locke, 1969).   
 
The release of the troops was a welcome gesture for many residents and business 
owners within the city. Many entities closed their doors in order to reduce potential 
damage and/or attempt to spare workers from potential danger. Hospitals, however, were 
unable to close. One in particular, Henry Ford Hospital, was located in the center of city. 
It was utilized as a command post for both local and federal officers. This meant that the 
location was a refuge for both those who were ‘waging battle’ against the rioters and 
those who were victims of the battle.  The hospital was utilized as a location to regroup, 
strategize, receive assistance as needed and obtain nourishment for law enforcement. The 
hospital recorded in its newsletter for that year that several hundreds of members of law 
enforcement benefited from the services offered by the hospital (Henry Ford Hospital, 
1967).  Due to its pivotal role in the turmoil, the staff at the facility had a front row seat to 
the carnage that was the consequence of the riot. Unlike other employees in the area, most 
healthcare workers were not allowed the option of simply staying home to avoid the 
turmoil. Nurse Dorothy Deremo (1992) of Henry Ford Hospital commented on what it 
was like to work in those conditions in the following excerpt:   
We all worked 15 to 18 hours per day, because there were no other people that 
could get in for about a week.  We would work double shifts and then come back 
to the dorm and sleep, work double shifts again.  There was really a need. 
 
 The need was reinforced on a daily basis as the riot continued. Many functions of 
the city ceased in operation. Most schools cancelled classes. Airline traffic was even 
affected by all inbound flights being delayed initially and ultimately cancelled. Law 
enforcement attempted to stave off the selling of contraband weapons and alcohol but 
were largely unsuccessful. The waves of gunfire, looting and arson continued with 
seemingly no end. Mayor Cavanaugh remarked infamously that during this time Detroit, 
“looked like Berlin in 1945” (Fine, 2007, p. 194).    
 
The second day would be when the majority of riot-related arrests were made; 
more than 3,000 ultimately (Fine, 2007). The first murder victim was also recorded as 
dying that day; a Caucasian property owner shot and killed a Caucasian male looter. Day 
three of the riot marked the transition of riot activity from the east side of the side to the 
  
west side. Day four of the riot is infamous because of the shootings in the Algiers Motel.3  
Officers killed three unarmed African American men and inured several others during a 
particularly brutal incident event that has never full been explained or remedied with 
regards to justice in the eyes of many (Fine, 2007; Johnson, 2008; Locke, 1969).  This 
singular event would become one of the signature occurrences of the deadly riot and it 
would make headlines around the world (Sugrue, 2009).  
 
The riot appeared to equally be the result of depressed economic conditions, as it 
was the result of racial unrest.  Those on the lowest rung on the socioeconomic ladder 
were indeed overwhelmingly African American, but the riot was an ‘opportunity’ for 
lower rung Caucasians as well.  In fact, it is estimated that less than 10% of the African 
American population at the time were involved in the riot (Widick, 1989).  Locke (1969) 
went as far as to describe the riot as “one of the most integrated events in recent history” 
(p. 17).  This fact was documented by local newspaper The Detroit News, whose 
extensive photographic coverage of the devastation of the riot resulted in its earning a 
Pulitzer Prize in 1968. S. E. Smith (1999) in her work Dancing in the Street:  Motown and 
the Cultural Politics of Detroit recorded a riot observer as commenting that the riot of 
1967 was, in fact, about “the propertied against the non-propertied” (p. 186). The single 
characteristic that many rioters had in common was the fact that they were opportunistic. 
There are descriptions of activities ranging from children being sent to looted stores with 
‘shopping lists’ for items needed in the home, to others being given the sole directive of 
identifying and destroying records of debt (Fine, 2007). Many looters expressed feeling 
that once a store had been looted its contents were available for public consumption. 
There was even evidence of groups of Caucasian individuals from as many as four 
different states participating in the looting and theft of merchandise (Widick, 1989). 
 
The riot ended on July 30th, after a total of 7 days of destruction. The federal 
troops left once it became clear that the riot was over. The Detroit Free Press recorded 
that a managing the riot required a total of “4,400 Detroit police, 8,000 national 
guardsmen, 4,700 federal troops and 360 state police” (Gavrilovich & McGraw, 2000, p. 
519). August 6th, 1957 was declared a day of mourning for the city of Detroit by 
Governor Romney.  
 
 The riot of 1967 was financially devastating to the city of Detroit. A review of the 
damages helps to support the claim by Hubert G. Locke – city administrator – that the riot 
was,  “the worst civil disorder of any American city in the 20th century” (Locke, 1969, p. 
23). The official death toll is still widely disputed but it was officially recorded as a total 
of 43. There were tens of thousands of individuals wounded (Fine, 2007; Gavrilovich & 
McGraw, 2000; Johnson, 2008; Locke, 1969). Hundreds of rounds of ammunition had 
been fired by the massive 17,000 member strong combined law enforcement entity 
comprised of individuals from the local municipal police department, the state of 
Michigan trooper force, the Michigan National Guard and the United States (Fine, 2007). 
                                                        
3 Ultimately, all officers were cleared of murder charges except for one. 
  
 
 An examination of the arrest patterns of the riot also yields compelling 
information. There were a total of 7,000 people arrested during the entire riot with 
teenagers comprising more than 10% of that number (Fine, 2007). Overwhelmingly, the 
race of those who were arrested was African American. This is ironic considering the fact 
that while Caucasians were only 12% of those individuals arrested, they were responsible 
for  “35 percent of the assault and battery charges, 31 percent of the concealed weapons 
charges, 27 percent of the arson charges, and 26 percent of the felonious assault charges” 
(Fine, 2007, p. 342). 
 
 There were also extensive environmental repercussions from the riot. Due to the 
fact that it occurred in the midst of the summer, there were consequences that would not 
have been as extreme had the riot occurred at a different time of the year. Many routine 
city services were suspended during the riot. This included garbage collection. The 
accumulation of normal trash was greatly enhanced by debris created in the dousing of 
water on the hundreds of fires and the lack of electricity that resulted from damaged 
power lines. There was spoiled food everywhere and the conditions drew massive 
amounts of flies and rodents. It is estimated that more than four tons of rat poison was 
disseminated throughout the most devastated areas (Fine, 2007). 
 
 It is difficult to assess the true financial impact of the riot because it is hard to 
assess how much money was lost in wages for those who were unable or unafraid to go to 
work. It is equally to difficult to assess the loss of profit for the organizations that closed 
their doors to the public during the riot. It is estimated that over 2500 structures were 
destroyed in some way during the riot, and of that figure nearly half of the fires were set 
via basic incendiary devices. The Michigan Insurance Bureau calculated that insured 
losses totaled $84 million, uninsured losses totaled $55 million, costs incurred by the 
local government involvement cost $11.5 million and the federal government’s 
involvement cost $2.5 million. This adds up to $153 million 1967 dollars. This amount 
would be $1.8 billion in 2014 dollars (CPI Inflation Index, 2014). 
 
 The impact of the Detroit riot of 1967 was indeed significant and has had residual 
effects to the present day; especially with regards to public perception. It did not help 
matters that Detroit is the only city its size in the United States that has been federally 
occupied twice; once during the riot of 1943 and again during the riot of 1967 (Fine, 
2007). After the riot of 1967, Caucasians and African Americans were unified in their 
anger about the destruction of their once beautiful city and the deeper racial divide that 
was the consequence of such violence. Many African Americans felt even more trapped 
in their neighborhoods. Caucasians who had the ability to move away from the city did so 
in droves. The riot marked a nearly 40-year migration away from the city and into 
underdeveloped surrounding suburbs, seeking a ‘safer’ environment. Known as “white 
flight”, the phenomenon was exacerbated by the illegal and discriminatory practices of 
the Federal Housing Administration, which all but eliminated loans within the city limits 
and increased the approvals of loans in suburban areas (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Sugrue, 
  
1996). The city of Detroit became increasingly black and while they were no longer 
limited to living in confined areas of the city, many still experienced subpar living 
conditions and exorbitant rental fees. The impact of the post-riot reality in the city of 
Detroit was not only damaging from a sociological aspect, but also economically. 
Economic investment within the city of Detroit was considered highly risky. Many 
corporations scaled back on hiring within the city and subsequently, there were less jobs 
and opportunities for those who had been left behind. The decline in available work 
opportunities led to a reduced tax base, which in turn left less funding for city services.  
 
 The psychological damage of the riot was equally (and, arguably) more extensive. 
The deep-seated distrust for local government that had been ignited after the riot of 1943 
was fully ablaze after the riot of 1967. The majority of the public officials in the city of 
Detroit at that time were Caucasian. Ironically, the African American community also 
expressed distrust for African American leaders also, assuming that their allegiance was 
not to the residents of the city of Detroit but more to the public officials. There is a photo 
of then U.S. Congressman John Conyers standing atop a vehicle with a bullhorn 
attempting to quell the fury expressed by rioters. He was joined by then Detroit Public 
School superintendent Arthur Johnson. Both men were African American and 
experienced bottles being hurled at them in response to their pleas for order. The lack of 
identification with even African American leaders who were viewed as part of the 
‘establishment’ was not unique to Detroit. It occurred in the other riots around the country 
as well. Famed African American leader Dick Gregory was shot in the leg while trying to 
calm an angry mob in an earlier riot (Fine, 2007). 
 
 Some of the anger expressed by the African American community was the result 
of a ‘witch hunt’ to identify the cause of the riot. There were accusations that instead of 
the riot being a social phenomenon born of frustration and extreme disparity, it was the 
brainchild of a few individuals. There was quite a bit of effort aimed towards proving 
whether the riot was the result of a conspiracy of a small group of residents. This theory 
was never proven to be true despite the fact that several residents were detained, 
questioned and placed under surveillance (Fine, 2007).  There were also discussions 
regarding whether the riot was simply a failure of leadership to acknowledge that the city 
of Detroit had not been the racial utopia that it had been purported to be. This failure was 
attributed to both Caucasian and African American leadership (Farley, Couper, & Krysan, 
2007; Fine, 2007; Sugrue, 2007).  There were debates over how the riot was addressed 
from an administrative perspective. The concerns covered the gamut from inquiries on 
how few officers were available to the use of militaristic force against U.S. Citizens (the 
majority of whom were African American) to how detainees were processed and treated 
while in custody.  The conversations were intense and slowly developed into expressions 
of concern and petitions for solutions.  
 
 Regardless of the impetus for the riot, it was clear and imperative that the city 
rebound from its state of crisis.  In order to effectively do this, both healing and growth 
needed to occur. The city needed to rebuild in every way imaginable. As a consequence 
  
to the rapidly dwindling tax base, this would mean that the surrounding suburbs would 
need to collaborate. The aftermath of the Detroit riot of 1967 is noted as being the 
impetus for a push towards regional collaboration between suburbs and the urban core 
and that the collaboration was key to ongoing success for the city (Alberti, 2012).   
Leading in Crisis 
 
 As anyone who has ever attempted to lead individuals is fully aware, effective 
leadership is a challenging endeavor. First and foremost, a leader must be able to inspire 
trust in those who follow him or her. Peter Drucker (2005) offers the following 
perspective:  
[A] requirement of effective leadership is to earn trust.  Otherwise, there won’t be 
any followers--and the only definition of a leader is someone who has followers.  
To trust a leader, it is not necessary to like him.  Nor is it necessary to agree with 
him.  Trust is the conviction that leader means what he says.  It is a belief in 
something very old-fashioned, called  “integrity.”  A leader’s actions and a 
leader’s professed beliefs must be congruent, or at least compatible.  Effective 
leadership--and again this is very old wisdom--is not based on being clever; it is 
based primarily on being consistent.  (p. 271) 
 
Drucker’s quote expresses the need for followers to connect with leaders in a 
meaningful way. This is further complicated by the fact that an individual’s ego rarely 
allows for trust without context. This perspective of leadership is both simple and 
complex at the same time, but understanding this delicate dynamic is critical when 
attempting to lead in crisis. In order to earn trust leaders must be tested and consistent. 
Simply attempting to “throw spaghetti to the wall to see if it sticks” does not apply in 
such scenarios. Leaders must commit to developing chains of communication that allow 
for an exchange and refining of ideas over a period of time. Small gains that are leading 
toward success are more important than massive goals that are not attainable. Leaders 
need to be able to demonstrate that they can be trusted and they also need to inspire others 
to follow their vision. McKee et al. (2008) expresses this in the following quote:  
The best leaders move people.  They engage people’s hearts and minds and help 
direct people’s energy, individually and collectively, toward a desired end.  And 
resonant leaders create a climate that is ripe with enthusiasm, hope, mutual 
support, and commitment.  In other words, they lead with emotional and social 
intelligence and create resonant climates that can, and do, and support both leaders 
and followers as both groups engage in the hard work of achieving goals and 
bringing about change.  (p. 212) 
 
    Senge (2006) offered another noteworthy addition to the qualifications of 
individuals who attempt to lead in crisis. He asserts that leaders need to not only 
“[possess] knowledge, leaders need to be aware of the power of mental models… [they] 
determine not only how we can make sense of the world, but how we can take action” (p. 
164). The concept of the strength of mental models is particularly acute during times of 
crisis, when the collective wisdom of the group may be more compelling than that of an 
  
individual viewpoint. Senge further explains that collective wisdom can be converted into 
shared vision. There was never a greater need for shared vision than in the aftermath of 
the riot of 1967.  In 2006 Senge wrote The Fifth Discipline, where he elaborated on the 
importance of shared vision: 
A shared vision is not an idea.  It is not even an important idea, such as freedom.  
It is, rather, a force in people’s hearts, a force of impressive power.  It may be 
inspired by an idea, but once it goes out further--if it is compelling enough to 
acquire the support of more than one person--then it is no longer an abstraction.  It 
is palpable.  People begin to see it as if it exists.  Few, if any, forces in human 
affairs are as powerful as shared vision.  (p. 192) 
 
 The research validates the claim the leadership is deceptively difficult in what can 
be considered “normal” times, so it stands to reason that it is even more challenging 
during turbulent times. It is easy to be the captain on a ship that is sailing on smooth 
waters, but a true leader can guide through stormy weather. As Peter Drucker (2005) 
beautifully expressed, the best leaders are “painfully aware that they are not in control of 
the universe” (p. 269). 
 
A crisis exacerbates the lack of stability within a given scenario at the very least 
and creates instability at the worst. It is for this reason that it is critical for leaders to 
attempt to establish a foundation upon which to rebuild. The processes through which 
leaders are charged to garner support and trust of their constituents is both an art and a 
science. Several thought leaders within the realm of crisis leadership have agreed that 
there are at least three stages in any crisis. Those stages include what happens before the 
event, what happens during the event itself and what happens after the event (Ulmer et al., 
2007). 
 
 The ‘pre-crisis stage’ refers to the ability of leadership to accurately predict the 
possibility of crisis and anticipate potential remedies to the subsequent damage that would 
occur (Ulmer et al., 2007).  Due to the rose colored glasses that many local government 
officials seemingly wore, the possibility of civil unrest did not appear to be a plausible 
risk to consider at that time. One would imagine that even in such an idealized scenario, 
however, officials should have at least been aware of the possibility due to the riots 
occurring in the other parts of the country at the time. Major cities with majority 
populations of African Americans were experiencing great turmoil as the indignation 
caused by a lack of civil rights became insurmountable. Detroit was no exception. Both 
the riot of 1943 and the riot of 1967 were the consequences of years of oppression and 
rage within the community, similarly the sister cities that experienced riots. Ironically, 
there had been evidence of rioting in other cities around the country before the 1943 riot 
in Detroit as well, so had leadership been thoughtful of the external social conditions 
before the 1943 riot they may have been better prepared before the 1967 riot. Thomas 
Sugrue, in Sweet Land of Liberty (2009), wrote: 
Urban riots were part of the black insurgency of the 1960s--an insurgency that 
trapped deep roots of discontent but also manifested the particular political and 
  
cultural sensibilities of the era.  They grew from simmering discontent at the 
continued subordination of African Americans.  The urban riots were, above all, 
about turf and control.  (p. 350).   
Regardless of what some may have imagined in their minds about Detroit being a ‘model’ 
city for race relations, it wasn’t. Race has always mattered in Detroit.  
 
The 1967 riot was not a surprise to many in the African American population in the city 
of Detroit.  Sydney Fine (2007) remarked: 
… although 53 percent of African American Detroit respondents in one survey 
indicated that they had been surprised by the riot, residents of the disturbance 
areas stated in interviews that they had been hearing before July 23, 1967, that 
Detroit was “long overdue” for a riot and that it would be next.  (p. 161) 
 
 Historian Thomas Sugrue agreed with this sentiment, expressing that the 
resentment had been simmering for decades and yet found a new fuse within the youth of 
the time, who also experienced economic hardship and hadn’t lived long enough to 
become used to disparate treatment. It would be determined that 10% of the arrests were 
of youths (Sugrue, 2009). Arthur Johnson was the deputy superintendent of Detroit Public 
Schools at the time of the riot of 1967. In his autobiography, he made the following point:  
In many respects, the riot was both shocking and predictable.  Predictable because 
the causes of the riot were the same issues that the black community has wanted 
addressed for a long time:  persistent police brutality and harassment; housing 
segregation and overcrowding, exacerbated by urban renewal targeting black 
neighborhoods; job discrimination, unemployment and poverty.  (p. 107) 
 
The biggest failure in the pre-crisis stage of the riot of 1967 was the failure to see 
the city for what it really was – a place with hurting people who were oppressed and 
angry for several decades prior at least. The reality was that Detroit had a deep history in 
both institutionalized and socialized racism and that it was ripe for a second riot to occur. 
The inability to acknowledge this was a lost opportunity to connect authentically with the 
residents of the city and potentially stave off the future devastation.  
 
 The second identified stage in crisis management is the actual event of the crisis 
(Ulmer et al., 2007).  As detailed previously, the initial response to the riot was one was 
surprise – and, subsequently – this lack of preparedness aided the initial disturbance into 
exponentially developing in a rapid fashion. Some may argue that the response of 
engaging federal military may have been premature and yet others may feel that it may 
have taken too long to engage external support. Regardless of one’s position on the level 
of appropriateness of the response once the riot began, it is important to note that all steps 
taken during a crisis matter. Leadership must still occur within crisis. Not only do leaders 
need to be effective in attempting to contain the crisis they must also attempt to reduce 
the likelihood of further destruction as much as possible.  
 
  
 The last phase identified is the post-crisis phase (Ulmer et al., 2007).  This may be 
the most important phase of the three. The goal at this point is to rebuild after the crisis. 
This is normally extensive work, and this was absolutely true after the riot of 1967. The 
process of rebuilding the city of Detroit took on a lot of meaning. There was both tangible 
damage and intangible damage that needed to be addressed both within the city and 
externally. The image of community and safety was obliterated for its residents. The 
external reputation of the city of Detroit absorbed a tremendous blow after the riot; 
particularly in light of the positive reputation it had held prior to the event. Heifetz, 
Grashow, and Linsky (2009) remarked that the post-crisis stage is the most challenging 
because, “people put enormous pressure on you to respond to their anxieties with 
authoritative certainty, even if doing so means overselling what you know and 
discounting what you don’t” (p. 2). The post-crisis period after the riot of 1967 was in 
desperate need for leadership that was different from any efforts put forth previously. 
Most importantly, Detroit needed effective leadership that addressed the root cause of 
unrest and built from that point forward. 
 
 Evaluating effective leadership during crisis is somewhat elusive and subjective. 
In 7 Lessons for Leading in Crisis, George (2009) said that a lack of adequate preparation 
about future outcomes and the inability to critically evaluate the consequences of actions 
and/or decisions made during a crisis will most assuredly lead to that crisis re-occurring 
in the future. He wrote that “like the weeds in your backyard, crises have roots with long 
tentacles that are buried deep underground.  If you cut down the weeds without removing 
the whole root, they will surely grow back” (p. 47).  This apt description applies not only 
to the 1967 riot but also hauntingly whispers from the post-crisis stage of the 1943 riot as 
well.  
 
Leadership Efforts After The Riot of 1967 
 
The post-crisis approach to the 1943 riot was a top-down approach. The local 
leaders met and devised a plan and the plan was implemented. There was not much 
involvement from residents within the city of Detroit and especially not from the African 
American population who were most directly impacted by the outcome of such significant 
decisions. One would imagine that after reviewing the less than ideal way that the riot of 
1943 was handled that the city would be better prepared to address the fall out of the 1967 
riot. Initially, it did not appear that this was true.  The immediate response to the riot was 
one of horror, revulsion and blame. Appallingly, Mayor Cavanaugh is quoted as 
suggesting “more emphasis should be placed on making rural life more attractive to 
Negroes even if it requires a back-to-land movement” (S. E. Smith, 1999, p. 204). This 
type of response mirrored that of then U.S. Attorney General Frances Biddle after the riot 
of 1943, when he pushed for the formulation of the “slum clearance” plan.  
 
After the riot of 1967, the community was more deeply damaged and much more 
negatively impacted than after the 1943 riot. Subsequently, a sense of futility and a lack 
of hope were prominent throughout the community. This was not aided by the 
  
tremendous amount of pressure and negative media that the city received after the riot. 
Thankfully, the local administration made the decision to pull together groups of local 
leaders comprised of both Caucasians and African Americans to address the underlying 
reasons for the unrest. The local groups largely codified into three organizations with 
slightly different goals. The organizations were The New Detroit Committee, Detroit 
Renaissance and Focus:HOPE.  
 
The New Detroit Committee was founded after Mayor Cavanaugh sent local 
leaders a letter that expressed, ”urgency in strengthening the communication between the 
core city and its outlying districts and suburban neighbors” (Office of Mayor Cavanaugh, 
1968). The New Detroit Committee made significant progress in the city through the 
work of four major subcommittees—employment and education, community 
redevelopment, community services and law and finance. The New Detroit Committee 
had 39 members, and considering the time period, was fairly diverse with nine African 
Americans and three women on the roster. Some of the more notable members included 
influential figures from many segments of the economy such as Damon Keith, who was a 
senior leader with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission, local labor leader Walter P. 
Reuther, auto executive Henry Ford II, JL Hudson CEO Joseph L. Hudson (who chaired 
the committee) and investor Max Fisher. 
 
 JL Hudson requested that committee members focus on the future as opposed to 
looking at past events and requested a focus on effective evaluation of projects that could 
revitalize the community in addition to securing capital for the completion of the projects 
(New Detroit, 1968).  This approach proved to be successful.  In its first 2 years of 
operation, The New Detroit Committee secured over $10 million in capital to fund 
community revitalization projects. Equally impressive is the fact that the funds were 
distributed directly to leaders within the community. Depending on the project, small 
community groups could receive grants as high as a maximum of $2 million (New 
Detroit, n.d.b, p. 7). 
 
The efforts of The New Detroit Committee were so successful that two of the 
leaders formed Detroit Renaissance in 1970, which was to be comprised of leaders in 
both the local government and economic development at the time. Neither Mayor 
Cavanaugh nor Governor Romney were re-elected after the riot of 1967.  Henry Ford II 
and Max Fisher (chair) invited the new mayor and governor (Roman Gibbs and William 
Milliken, respectively), local bank president Robert Surdam, Chrysler executive Virgil 
Boyd, and General Motors executive James Roche to join them (Detroit Renaissance, 
1973).  The goal of Detroit Renaissance was to zero in on rebuilding economic 
development in the city, specifically highlighting the downtown area. At a meeting of the 
Detroit Economic Club shortly after the formation of Detroit Renaissance Max Fisher 
acknowledged the momentum created by The New Detroit Committee and identifying its 
success at  “[improving] the conditions and opportunities for the disadvantaged” while 
highlighting that the specific goal of Detroit Renaissance was to “pull all of Detroit’s 
great economic assets together” (Fisher, 1971). 
  
 
The pinnacle project of Detroit Renaissance was a $500 million project to be 
located at the center of the downtown area. The project was to include convention space, 
a hotel, capacity for office space for businesses and potentially even residential real estate 
development. The project was named the Detroit Renaissance Center, and it was intended 
to be a symbol that always represented Detroit’s rebirth after the riot of 1967 (Detroit 
Renaissance, 1973). The finished product utilized more than 400,000 cubic yards of 
concrete, 40,000 tons of structural steel, and two million square feet of glass (Rencen, 
n.d.). It had four towers, a hotel with 73 floors, boasted 5.5 million square feet of space 
and had its own ZIP code.  The project additionally held the distinction of being the 
largest project that was privately funded at the time (Rencen, n.d.). It would eventually 
become a landmark icon of the city. 
 
While the work of both The New Detroit Committee and Detroit Renaissance was 
meaningful and necessary in the work of re-building the city’s economic base, more work 
was needed to restore the damaged ‘soul’ of the city. One of the projects that The New 
Detroit Committee funded within its first two years of inception was focused on that work 
and it was named Focus: HOPE. 
 
Focus: HOPE focused in on the needs of the citizens of the city of Detroit. It was 
an ideal compliment to The New Detroit Committee and Detroit Renaissance. The 
organization was the brainchild of two members of the Archdiocese of Detroit – Fathers 
Jerome Fraser and William T. Cunningham along with parish member Eleanor Josaitis.  
Each of the individuals was committed to attempting to address the history of racial 
unrest within the city and the impact that it had on the residents. One of the major 
newspapers – The Michigan Chronicle – described Focus:HOPE as being  “a unique, far-
reaching educational program aimed at easing racial tensions and fostering a positive 
approach to community solidarity” (Pitcher, 1968).   
 
The first major initiative of Focus: HOPE was to develop a program called 
Summer Hope ’68. The goal of this program was to encourage the community to commit 
to a summer of peace on the first year anniversary of the riot.  Another major goal of the 
organization was to coordinate and implement community dialogue sessions that allowed 
for local clergy to participate in conversations on parity for all residents of the city 
regardless of their race. This tactic of direct contact with residents was rather successful; 
more than 85,000 of the meetings occurred within the first year (Talbert, 1969). These 
conversations assisted the organization in identifying the most vital needs in the 
community at the time. 
 
One of the most pervasive needs within the community after the riot was food. 
Focus:HOPE developed programs to distribute food to the area’s most vulnerable citizens 
– women, children and seniors. Ultimately, the organization would go on to develop 
workforce-training programs, programs for high school completion, and offer assistance 
to individuals who had transportation challenges as well. Each of these basic needs 
  
represented the true impact of years of racism and a riot that made life even worse for 
those who needed assistance the most. Focus:HOPE played as equally critical a role post-
riot as those focused on economic development by addressing the needs of the people at 
the most basic of levels. The organization was committed to, “[taking] intelligent and 
practical steps to root out racism, poverty and injustice” (Focus: HOPE, 1968).  This led 
to the development of the organization’s symbol – one African American hand and one 
Caucasian hand reaching toward each other under the word hope.  
 
How Detroit’s Past Lessons Can Shape Its Future 
 
 There is a substantial difference between the effectiveness of the leadership efforts 
after the riot of 1943 and 1967. The Detroit Plan of 1943 was not inaccurate in its desire 
to regain economic footing; it simply was not complete in that it did not fully address 
what needed to be remedied after the riot. The leadership response in 1943 focused solely 
on economic development with virtually no regard for the impact that this would have on 
the residents of the city of Detroit. In fact, many of the residents were viewed as part of 
the problem and not invited to offer their perspective or voice their concerns. Instead of 
bringing the community together, it drove them further apart.  
 
 The leadership response after the riot of 1967 was multifaceted and arguably more 
effective. Economic development was a key component as well, but with more thoughtful 
consideration. The New Detroit Committee was deliberate about seeking input from the 
community on economic development projects. Subsequently, not only were the residents 
of the city encouraged to submit viable ideas, they were entrusted with the funds to 
manage the project themselves. There was recognition that most of the individuals who 
comprised the New Detroit Committee were unaware of what to do to best facilitate 
healing and regrowth for the city. This acknowledgement, backed by the powerful 
influence and support of individuals who were significant business leaders, proved to be 
the golden formula. Detroit Renaissance knew that the ability for Detroit to regain its 
reputation as a viable center for commerce and development was crucial. Developing the 
Renaissance Center was considered to be a hopeful gesture that would spur both loyalty 
and economic interest from potential investors. It remains one of the most iconic symbols 
of the city and has had occupancy by some of the areas most successful organizations, 
with the world headquarters of General Motors residing within the structure as of 2014. 
The fact that the project was privately funded was a bold sign of support for the potential 
of the city and it did indeed draw commerce and infusion of capital into the city.  
 
 Focus:HOPE proved that the rebuilding of a city also requires acknowledgement 
of chasms in the community. The city of Detroit has had a history of racism that has 
resulted in years of mistrust and an imbalance of opportunities for those of the lowest 
economic strata (which are overwhelmingly African American). It is important for this 
institutionalized discrimination and the subsequent psychosocial damage to be 
acknowledged and addressed in order for the community to heal and move forward. Both 
  
of the riots showed us that attempting to ignore the significance of this could have dire 
consequences.  
 
Focus:HOPE committed to having courageous conversations that led to their 
ability to discern some of the true needs of the residents and respond. Focus:HOPE 
recognized that the answers to many of the issues lay within the wisdom of the collective 
community. In order to truly conduct a root cause analysis, one must not be afraid of the 
potential answers it might find.  The good, the bad and the ugly must be considered in 
order to properly devise effective solutions. Focus:HOPE also introduced the concept of 
the need to ‘triage’ ancillary issues (such as lack of transportation, day care or even food) 
as being a viable barrier for many citizens to find and sustain gainful employment. As 
evidenced in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1997), in order to get to the top of 
the pyramid the most basic needs have to be secure. This led to Focus:HOPE being able 
to develop a reputation as a trusted leader, which we have learned is critical in leading 
through crisis.  
 
 The lessons learned after the riot of 1967 prove that the most effective leaders are 
not the source of the solutions; at best, they are conductors of a disparate orchestra of 
challenges and resources and the goal is to keep everyone on the same key. An effective 
leader in crisis is a person who understands that they are only as strong as the units within 
their community are and that where there is no trust there is no leadership. The leaders 
who emerged after the riot of 1967 seemed to understand this and still accepted the call to 
lead. McKee et al. (2008) identified these types of leaders as “resonant,” and described 
them as being fearless yet focused. Subsequently, they are capable of fostering great 
transformation.  
 
 Another important lesson to be learned in the aftermath of the riot of 1967 is the 
fact that as important as the community is, it cannot survive without an infusion of 
capital. Even the most thoughtful community program needs to be funded. The key to 
success after the riot was the joining of these two powerful forces within the city of 
Detroit. This level of focus on both investing in local business ventures and keeping an 
eye on being attractive to potential capital investors is a strategy that needs to continue in 
today’s Detroit.  
 
 It is important to note the fact that the leaders who emerged after the riot of 1967 
came from diverse walks of life. Some of the traditional ‘lines’ that may have normally 
separated individuals seemed to erase for the sake of the larger goal of repairing the city. 
Some individuals lived in the city and some did not. Some were African American and 
some were Caucasian. The key is that they had the same vision of a future for a city that 
was at that time close to ruin. This level of intention must be replicated today. It can be 
argued that Detroit gave birth to all of the suburbs that surround it and the time has come 
to pay homage to that fact through support and empathy. Detroit needs to be a thriving 
urban center in order for its surrounding cities to survive. No man -or suburb- is an island.  
  
Suburban leadership would be wise to be deliberate in identifying opportunities to assist 
Detroit in its journal for renewal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The city of Detroit is considered by many to be in the midst of the most 
significant crisis of its existence. The reality is that not only is this not the first time that 
Detroit has experienced crisis, the city has rarely not rebounded from its woes. Some 
liken the current bankruptcy to be the boisterous winds of a tumultuous tornado of doom. 
At the center of every tornado, however, is a calm center. History has whispered its 
warnings from the past and also offered assurances that there is still a future. The future 
will most likely not look like anything that came before it in structure but its foundation 
can still be solid. Similar to the task of leaders after the riot of 1967, today’s leaders have 
to rebuild in the wake of significant loss. In additionally similar fashion, there will need 
to be a deliberate and sustained collaboration between both industry and the community. 
The memory of the city retains the knowledge that in times of collective vision and 
commitment it soars. 
 
Thankfully, there are signs of renewal with the city of Detroit. There are enclaves 
of creative artists who draw a demographic of young professionals who desire an 
interesting urban core for habitation. There are business incubators that are sponsored by 
corporate entities and seek out compelling business ideas from budding entrepreneurs. 
The city has become home to a flourishing ‘pop up’ business phenomenon, which allows 
businesses who perhaps have a great idea but not enough capital for dedicated retail space 
to creatively showcase their wares in a myriad of ways.  
 
There have been significant financial contributions to Detroit’s renewal as well.  
Two of the more recent contributors are JP Morgan Chase, which has pledged to invest 
$100 million in the next five years (2014) and a $400,000 grant from the Knight 
Foundation to increase the knowledge and development of community leaders (2014). 
There are grants and programs to support this unique type of entrepreneurism such as 
D:Hive and Resolve Detroit. Entrepreneurialism is what made Detroit into an economic 
powerhouse decades prior. Between Henry Ford’s contribution and the thriving 
businesses that existed within the Black Bottom and Paradise Valley communities 
(despite significant economic impairment), Detroit’s past has much to contribute in this 
area. Hence, continuing to support entrepreneurial endeavors is a nod to the city’s rich 
past and an investment in its future.  
 
There is a sort of vibrant murmuring in current Detroit that is different and yet 
familiar at the same time. The voices are not limited by age or race or economic status. 
The ‘insiders’ express love and protectiveness of their city, boasting of their heritage on 
t-shirts and through devoted and thoughtful blog entries. Even ‘outsiders’ have begun to 
notice to the pride and love and hidden beauty of Detroit. This is the basis for the chorus 
for the city’s next act in one of the most intriguing plays of any American city.  
  
 
As expressed previously, the key for today’s leaders is to realize that they do not 
hold all of the answers within themselves. To be an effective leader in the city of Detroit 
in the wake of bankruptcy is to realize that many of the tools and resources have to 
emerge from the residents in concert with those who have access to resources. Like jazz, 
each of these components respects the contributions of the other and results in complex 
beauty. If the goal of leaders is to create a sustainable community and enrich the legacy 
of the city of Detroit then this is the only path.  
 
Today’s Detroit is not a place of desolate dreams of what used to be. It is resilient 
and thick-skinned. Weathered and proven in its ability to remain standing in the most 
precarious conditions. It is what poet Tupac Shakur (1999) referred to as a rose in the 
concrete, which he describes in the following poem: 
 
Did you hear about the rose that grew from a crack 
in the concrete 
Proving nature’s law is wrong it learned 2 walk 
without having feet 
Funny it seems, but by keeping its dreams, 
it learned 2 breathe fresh air 
Long live the rose that grew from concrete 
when no one else even cared! 
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